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 DIMENSIONS OF THE THREAT TO THE SELF
POSED BY DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION:
PERSONAL IDENTITY, AUTHENTICITY, AND AUTONOMY
– Przemysław Zawadzki –
Abstract: Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is an invasive therapeutic method involving the implantation 
of electrodes and the electrical stimulation of specifi c areas of the brain to modulate their activity. 
DBS brings therapeutic benefi ts, but can also have adverse side effects. Recently, neuroethicists have 
recognized that DBS poses a threat to the very fabric of human existence, namely, to the selves of pa-
tients. This article provides a review of the neuroethical literature examining this issue, and identifi es 
the crucial dimensions related to the self which DBS may endanger—personal identity, authenticity, 
and autonomy. The most infl uential theories accounting for these dimensions are analyzed herein, 
and it is argued that most of these theories require further refi nement. This paper also demonstrates 
the interrelation between personal identity, authenticity, and autonomy, and concludes that one can 
only fully understand the impact of DBS on the self when all of these factors are taken into account.
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Therapeutic potential
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is an invasive therapeutic method involving the im-
plantation of electrodes and the electrical stimulation of specifi c regions of the brain.1 
Depending on the disease and treatment strategy, different structures are targeted, 
for example, the subthalamic nucleus (STN), the globus pallidus internus (GPi), or the 
nucleus accumbens (NAc). The exact action mechanism of DBS has not yet been con-
fi rmed. The proposed models, however, can be divided into four categories.2 Models 
of the fi rst category reduce the effect of DBS to the inhibition of the neuronal activity of 
the targeted areas for stimulation; the second to the excitation of these areas; models of 







1 Hemm, Wårdell (2010); Herrington, Cheng, Eskandar (2016).
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and the fourth considers DBS to be interrupting pathological oscillations to regain the 
synchronized, rhythmic activity of the brain waves.4
The lack of consensus among researchers about these mechanisms has not pre-
vented the systematic use of this technology for medical purposes.5 After the introduc-
tion of the fi rst commercial system for clinical use in 1997,6 DBS proved its therapeutic 
potential in a number of intractable neurological and psychiatric disorders for which 
previous treatments (e.g. pharmacotherapy, cognitive behavioral therapy) had not pro-
vided satisfactory results, such as Parkinson’s disease (PD),7 dystonia,8 essential tremor,9 
and obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD).10 This prompted the American Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) to approve DBS as a treatment for these ailments. Thus, DBS 
should be considered a treatment of last resort for patients with no other viable treatment 
options.11 The therapeutic range of DBS is constantly expanding, with experimental stud-
ies conducted in the treatment of epilepsy,12 Tourette’s syndrome,13 treatment–resistant 
depression,14 Alzheimer’s disease and other forms of dementia,15 anorexia,16 obesity,17 
disorders of consciousness,18 chronic pain,19 Huntington’s disease,20 addictions,21 aggres-
sion,22 and schizophrenia.23 In Poland, DBS is mainly used as a treatment for PD, as well 
as for dystonia and essential tremor.24 Some centers in Poland are also working on the 
use of DBS for psychiatric disorders: the 10th Military Research Hospital and Polyclinic 
IPHC in Bydgoszcz, the University Hospital in Wroclaw, and the Wroclaw Medical 
University have experience in this fi eld. Currently, a multicenter study is planned on 
the use of DBS in patients with treatment–resistant depression.25
Several companies that produce DBS equipment are operating in the market. In 
2017, the leading manufacturer, Medtronic Activia, announced that 150,000 patients had 
already used their systems for DBS therapies, and this number increases annually by 
4 Chiken, Nambu (2015).
5 Fitzgerald, Segrave (2015).
6 Gardner (2013).
7 Hickey, Stacy (2016).
8 Vidailhet, Jutras, Grabli et al. (2013).
9 Ostrem, Racine, Glass et al. (2011).
10 Hamani, Pilitsis, Rughani et al. (2014).
11 Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer for pushing me to suffi ciently emphasize this crucial fea-
ture of DBS therapy as it has important consequences for the neuroethical considerations in this paper.
12 Fisher, Salanova, Witt et al. (2010).
13 Schrock, Mink, Woods et al. (2015).
14 Bewernick, Kayser, Sturm et al. (2012).
15 Laxton, Lozano (2013).
16 Lipsman, Woodside, Lozano (2013).
17 Whiting, Tomycz, Bailes et al. (2013).
18 Schiff, Giacino, Kalmar et al. (2007).
19 Falowski (2015).
20 Starr (2013).
21 Kuhn, Bührle, Lenartz et al. (2013).
22 Franzini, Broggi, Cordella et al. (2013).
23 Corripio, Roldán, Sarró et al. (2020).
24 Beszłej, Siwicki, Fila-Witecka et al. (2019).
25 Beszłej, Wieczorek, Kobyłko et al. (2019).
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approximately 10,000. Currently, the number of patients considerably exceeds 160,00026 
and is estimated at 175,000.27 These numbers show that DBS plays an important role in 
the lives of many people, and as research progresses on the disorders that are currently 
under study, this impact will include further groups of patients.28
DBS technologies
DBS systems consist of one or more electrodes inserted into the nervous tissue of the 
deep brain, connected via a subcutaneous extension wire to a stimulator (“pacemaker”) 
implanted in the left subclavian area. In order to stimulate the electrodes, the pacemaker 
generates rectangular electrical pulses. Typical DBS parameter settings for movement 
disorders range from 2 to 4 V amplitude, with a 60–450 μs pulse width at a frequency of 
130–185 Hz.29 The implantation procedure marks the fi rst stage of the therapy; followed by 
the device programming process. Until recently, this was performed by painstakingly ad-
justing the parameters of the stimulation by trial and error. Newer techniques facilitate the 
programming process30 by enabling the more optimal adjustment of parameters based on:
(1) determining the precise location of the electrodes by Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) or pre–operative MRI in combination with post–operative 
tomography imaging;
(2) determining the desired target of stimulation with the help of previous clinical 
experience and estimation of current spread within the brain tissue.
This approach is referred to as “open loop” DBS (OL–DBS), and although it is 
currently the most common technique, it has been recognized as problematic for various 
reasons. First, it results in a mismatch between the time course of the disease and the 
timing of adjustments, since clinicians can only adjust the stimulation parameters during 
medical appointments with patients. Second, it is based on a subjective assessment of 
the parameters that are benefi cial in each treatment. Third, it applies a stimulus pattern 
established during the programming process throughout the entire lifetime of the device. 
This operating mode typically results in the battery discharging within 2–5 years;31 it 
must then be surgically replaced, which has additional costs, stress, and risks associated 
with the procedure.32 Finally, the constant activity of OL–DBS can lead to undesirable 
permanent changes in neurotransmission in the long run,33 as well as non–stimulation–
dependent neural reorganization.34
 To resolve these problems, researchers have investigated and developed a new 
generation of DBS systems, commonly referred to as “closed loop” DBS (CL–DBS). 
The CL–DBS paradigm is defi ned by the dynamic adjustment of parameters based on 
26 Lozano, Lipsman, Bergman et al. (2019).
27 Medtronic (2021). 
28 Chhatbar, Saha (2015).
29 Kuncel, Grill (2004).
30 Frankemolle, Wu, Noecker et al. (2010).
31 Ondo, Meilak, Vuong (2007).
32 Deuschl, Herzog, Kleiner-Fisman et al. (2006).
33 Glannon (2016).
34 Ruge, Cif, Limousin et al. (2011).
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the patient’s current clinical condition assessed by measuring brain activity.35 CL–DBS 
developed from the fi eld of brain–computer interfaces (BCIs)—algorithms intended to 
identify the intentions of a person from brain activity to provide control over prosthetic/
assistive devices.36 Implementing BCIs in CL–DBS systems allows classifi cation of brain 
activity as “healthy” or “adverse.”37 Thanks to this procedure, CL–DBS can deliver and 
adjust stimulation in real time according to the particular needs of the patient. For exam-
ple, when employed in the treatment of epilepsy, it detects early indicators of seizures 
and applies current to prevent the impending attacks.38 Compared to OL–DBS, CL–DBS 
systems result in better adaptation to specifi c disease dynamics, less invasiveness in 
neurotransmission, and reduced battery consumption.39 The CL–DBS paradigm has 
shown promising results for both neurological diseases like epilepsy40 or PD,41 as well 
as psychiatric disorders such as OCD and major depression.42 
The emerging trend in DBS–based treatments is not only meant to facilitate the 
automatic adjustment of the stimulation in response to the abnormal neuronal activation 
associated with a given disease, but also to provide patients with the kind of active con-
trol which allows them to respond to the symptoms and autonomously address thera-
peutic goals. Systems that aim to facilitate this differ operationally from CL–DBS systems, 
as they are closed–loop advisory brain devices43 or volitional CL–DBS (VCL–DBS).44 In 
short, when the device detects unwanted neuronal activation, it gives a patient a visual or 
auditory signal. On this basis, the patient can decide whether stimulation should begin, 
be increased, and/or rejected.45 Hence, VCL–DBS enables the patients to stay “in the 
decisional therapeutic loop”.46 In that regard, it offers them additional opportunities to 
choose between experiencing symptoms and suffering side effects. However, it produces 
other risks which will be considered in the following sections.
Reports of DBS–induced changes to the self of patients
As mentioned above, DBS is a last resort treatment for intractable diseases and it often 
provides benefi cial therapeutic effects. Therefore, patients suffering from such diseases 
who are not candidates for DBS or do not have access to it will continue to suffer from 
untreated symptoms of their disorder. But DBS itself can also lead to unwanted side 
effects. Thus, there are adverse effects which may sometimes constitute inevitable trade-
offs for DBS when it is used to control disease-related symptoms. Therefore, one of the 
crucial questions in the neuroethics of DBS is how we should evaluate the comparative 
35 Miocinovic, Somayajula, Chitnis et al. (2013).
36 Widge, Dougherty, Moritz (2014).
37 That is, responsible for the symptoms of a given ailment.
38 Morrell (2011).
39 Parastarfeizabadi, Kouzani (2017).
40 Cook, O’Brien, Berkovic et al. (2013).
41 Little, Pogosyan, Neal et al. (2013).
42 Aggarwal, Chugh (2020).
43 Gilbert, O’Brien, Cook (2018).
44 Brown, Moore, Herron et al. (2016).
45 Goering, Klein, Dougherty et al. (2017).
46 Gilbert, O’Brien, Cook (2018).
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risks and benefi ts of taking DBS therapy (as well as not receiving it at all). Two main 
lines of risk analysis associated with DBS have appeared in the neuroethical literature: 
(more) traditional and non–traditional. The former, more traditional forms of threats 
resulting from DBS therapy include effects in several domains: physical,47 cognitive,48 
affective,49 and communication disorders.50 Moreover, DBS may also lead to unrealistic 
expectations for treatment,51 suicidal ideation,52 issues associated with informed consent,53 
privacy and data security,54 and have regulatory implications.55 
DBS also appears to constitute threats that have not traditionally been discussed 
in the literature concerning the implications of neurotechnologies.56 They have become 
the subject of lively interest in recent years, when many neuroethicists have expressed 
concerns over the potential negative impact of DBS on the selves of patients.57 These 
concerns were initially raised by individual reports of patients treated with DBS. 
One such example was the case of a man suffering from Tourette’s syndrome. 
As soon as the amplitude of DBS increased, he rolled into the corner, covered his face, 
and repeated in a high, broken voice that he was innocent. The sentences he spoke were 
grammatically incorrect. When the medical staff tried to help him, he would not allow 
it, and kept shouting that he was afraid of being locked in the basement. However, when 
the amplitude of the stimulation was reduced, the patient returned to his previous self, 
forgetting what had happened, and only reporting that he had a dim recollection of 
being overwhelmed by bad memories from his childhood.58 
There have also been cases of patients who, despite functioning seemingly well in 
most of their everyday activities, nonetheless experienced extreme personality changes 
and developed uncharacteristic behavior. For example, Bhargava and Doshi reported the 
cases of a 70–year–old male and a 58–year–old female suffering from advanced PD, who 
underwent subthalamic nucleus stimulation to treat the motor symptoms of PD.59 How-
ever, DBS induced sexual urges in these patients; urges they were unable to control. At 
the one–month follow–up visit, the wife of the 70–year–old man reported to the doctors 
that after DBS “he would insist on sexual gratifi cation every night and would become 
very aggressive if denied. Once satisfi ed he would return back to his normal self.”60 Sim-
47 Chan, Zhu, Yeung et al. (2009).
48 Witt, Daniels, Reiff et al. (2008).
49 Rabins, Appleby, Brandt et al. (2009).
50 Ahlberg, Laakso, Hartelius (2011).
51 Montel, Bungener (2009).
52 Gilbert (2013).
53 Beeker, Schlaepfer, Coenen (2017); Glannon (2010); Nyholm, Campbell (2016).
54 Denning, Matsuoka, Kohno (2009).
55 Stahl, Cabrera, Gibb (2018).
56 More recently, the potential of another neurotechnology, i.e., the memory-modifying potential 
of optogenetics, has prompted neuroethicists to discuss non-traditional risks also in the context of 
possible future use of optogenetics (see: Adamczyk, Zawadzki, 2020; Zawadzki, Adamczyk, 2021).
57 Baylis (2013); Clausen (2009); Gilbert (2018); Glannon (2014b); Hildt (2006); Merkel, Boer, Fegert et 
al. (2007); Nyholm, O’Neill (2016); Schechtman (2010); Schermer (2011); Synofzik, Schlaepfer (2008); 
Witt, Kuhn, Timmermann et al. (2013).
58 Goethals, Jacobs, Van der Linden et al. (2008).
59 Bhargava, Doshi (2008).
60 Ibidem.
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ilarly, the 58–year–old woman preoperatively had almost no sexual relationship with 
her husband for years, but after DBS she often forced herself into her husband’s room 
for sexual purposes. More strikingly, with time she also started to expose herself to other 
males in her family, demanding sex. Surprisingly, despite experiencing these changes, 
whenever doctors evaluated her, she acted as “an extremely mature person who showed 
no indications of her abnormal behavior.”61 This behavior continued for fi ve years, until 
it was controlled with the introduction of an antipsychotic drug. 
Another example of DBS–induced changes to the self of a person is the case of a 
patient suffering from OCD, known in the literature under the cryptonym “Mr. B.” His 
treatment with DBS was effective, but simultaneously caused an unexpected reaction. 
Under the infl uence of DBS therapy, Mr. B. became a fan of a very narrow subset of 
music: Johnny Cash’s songs from the late stage of his career, that is, when the musician’s 
voice became “harsher.” His new appreciation was so intense that he bought all of the 
performer’s records and assigned selected works to specifi c occasions and moods. More-
over, he claimed that listening to Cash’s music gave him confi dence. When the device 
was turned off, however, Mr. B. lost interest in the artist’s music, along with his newly 
acquired self–confi dence. Mr. B. applied two separate names for his self–transformations: 
“Mr B. I” to the self when DBS was turned off, and “Mr. B. II” to the self with the activat-
ed device. He also behaved in a way that made the medical staff believe that whenever 
DBS was active, he felt like a new, improved version of himself.62
Lipsman and Glannon, inspired by an actual clinical case,63 proposed an example 
of a 70–year–old professor suffering from PD, who, unlike Mr. B, did not feel that DBS 
treatment had radical self–transformative effects, but his relatives reported that it was 
the case. Along with a reduction in symptoms of the disease, the patient acquired a ten-
dency to impulsiveness and mood swings, involving rapid changes from a depressed 
to a euphoric state. Due to these changes, his daughter reported that she no longer per-
ceived her father to be the same person than before the therapy: “It’s as if he’s someone 
else entirely, […] he’s there, and he’s our dad, but not like we’ve always known him.”64
More reports of cases in which patients experienced similar changes due to DBS 
treatment can be found in various qualitative studies,65 as well as the fi rst systematic 
study addressing these unwanted effects in a semiquantitative way which has been 
61 Ibidem.
62 Mantione, Figee, Denys (2014).
63 Some details of the actual case that inspired Lipsman and Glannon’s vignette was changed to pre-
serve confi dentiality and to emphasize some aspects of the case that the authors wanted to highlight. 
Thus, it is important to emphasize that although cases discussed by Lipsman and Glannon are not 
“uncommon” in the current DBS practice, there are fi ctional components in this particular vignette –
in contrast to the all previously discussed cases.
64 Lipsman, Glannon (2013).
65 Agid, Schüpbach, Gargiulo et al. (2006); de Haan, Rietveld, Stokhof et al. (2013); de Haan, Rietveld, 
Stokhof et al. (2015); Gilbert, Goddard, Viaña et al. (2017); Gilbert, Viaña (2018); Gilbert (2018); Haahr, 
Kirkevold, Hall et al. (2013); Hariz, Limousin, Tisch et al. (2011); Houeto (2002); Lewis, Maier, Horst-
kötter et al. (2015); Liddle, Phillips, Gustafsson et al. (2018); Mathers, Rick, Jenkinson et al. (2016); 
Pham, Solbakk, Skogseid et al. (2015); Scaratti, Zorzi, Guastafi erro et al. (2020); Schüpbach, Gargiulo, 
Welter et al. (2006); Smeets, Duits, Horstkötter et al. (2018); Thomson, Segrave, Carter (2019); Thom-
son, Segrave, Racine et al. (2020).
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recently published.66 Based on these results, there is now a broad consensus in the neu-
roethical literature that DBS may fundamentally alter the selves of patients.67 However, 
how a neuroethicist captures DBS–induced changes depends on a conceptual scheme 
she applies. Over the years, scholars have proposed various different understandings 
of the self, this elusive, yet familiar phenomenon. 
Theories of the self and neuroethical considerations of DBS
One of the fi rst theories of the self proposed in the neuroethical literature68 in an attempt 
to understand DBS effects was that of Synofzik and Schlaepfer.69 In opposition to the 
subjective tradition of theories of the self, such as the Cartesian concept, they propose 
a naturalistic model, describing the self as an objective, biological–cognitive represent-
ative system with the ability of self–representation. This self–representation, however, 
is not built by a homogeneous, monolithic entity. In contrast to how it phenomenally 
appears, the self is in fact constructed by various modules operating on different levels 
of representational and functional complexity. The most fundamental are levels consist-
ing of sensomotor processes, while the most complex are those covering conceptual and 
meta–representational processes. This system of self–representation is able to produce 
subjective representations of the self of a person based on her actions, perceptions, 
emotions, and beliefs. Witt et al. criticize Synofzik and Schlaepfer’s model;70 they point 
out that if one was to consistently maintain it, the self would become an ephemeral, 
ever–changing phenomenon. As such, this approach is not helpful for understanding 
the actual clinical cases of patients that experienced DBS–induced changes. 
Witt and colleagues propose a foundational–function model, in which only chang-
es in central attitudes of the person, i.e., beliefs, expectations, desires, ideals, or plans, 
could pose a real threat to the self. From this hierarchical perspective, only DBS-induced 
changes in the most central attitudes imply self–disruption. In order to apply this the-
ory to neuroethical considerations, one must identify which attitudes count as “core” 
or “central” for a person. Moreover, one should also ask why changes in core attitudes 
should matter from a moral perspective, as well as how one could distinguish between 
changes that matter morally from those that do not. The authors offer some guidance 
for the future empirical research that might allow clarifi cation of these issues.71 
In contrast to both of the theories described above, Schechtman argues that the 
self should be understood in narrative terms.72 She claims that only narrative identity, 
66 Eich, Müller, Schulze-Bonhage (2019).
67 Though there are important exceptions; for example, the literature review of Gilbert, Viaña, Ineichen 
(2018) who examined over 1,500 articles to investigate the scientifi c evidence regarding DBS-induced 
changes on the personality, and suggest that the theoretical neuroethics debate on the putative effects 
of DBS relies on limited empirical evidence.
68 In reconstructing the debate on the nature of the self in the neuroethical literature, I build on the 
article of Dings and de Bruin (2016), in which the authors identifi ed the most infl uential theoretical 
positions proposed in this discussion.
69 Synofzik, Schlaepfer (2008).
70 Witt, Kuhn, Timmermann et al. (2013).
71 Ibidem.
72 Schechtman (2009); Schechtman (2010).
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with its historical dimension allowing the introduction of patterns of coherence and 
meaning between individual experiences, meets a commonsensical expectation for our 
concept of the self. We create who we are through the construction of an autobiograph-
ical narrative. The relation of the narrative and the self can be conceptualized in two 
ways in this approach: narrative can play a strong role (i.e., create the self), or a weak 
role (i.e., be created by the self). However, we are probably dealing here with some-
thing similar to the hermeneutic circle, i.e., the self of the person is constructed by the 
narrative. On the other hand, this narrative is narrated by that person’s self.73 Not all 
narratives can be identifi ed as constituting the self.74 For this to be the case, they must 
meet the constraints of articulation and reality. The fi rst constraint states that a person 
must be able to present her story, life situation and motivations. It does not have to be 
an accurate and completely coherent story, but the narrator should be able to explain 
why she does what she does, believes what she believes, and feels what she feels. The 
second constraint indicates that the personal narrative must be coherent with the basic 
facts about the person and her life. The narrative cannot be delusional, rest on evident 
factual errors, be resistant to revision in light of contrary evidence, or be entirely incon-
sistent with how others view ourselves.75 Baylis considers Schechtman’s claim regarding 
the narrative and autobiographical nature of the self to be true.76 However, she embraces 
an account of the self inspired by feminist thought, in which the self is constituted in and 
through relationships. In her relational approach, Baylis recognizes embodied nature of 
the self that is situated in particular social, cultural, political, and historical contexts. She 
claims that the self resides not only in the brain, but in the negotiated spaces between 
one’s body and brain as well as the brains and bodies of others. In Baylis’s approach, the 
narrative constitutive for the self effectively balances between how the person perceives 
and understands herself, and how others perceive and understand her. In this model, the 
potentially threatening effects of DBS on the selves of patients are those that can disturb 
this balance in a way that would infringe on the person’s autonomy.
Problems of proposed models of the self and some suggestions for their resolution
It seems that the disagreement in the literature regarding the concept that adequately 
characterizes the self in the context of the neuroethical considerations concerning the 
consequences of DBS is profound. Furthermore, most approaches postulate relatively 
narrow concepts of the self, focusing on one or two of its aspects, and emphasize the 
representational,77 functional,78 narrative,79 or relational dimensions.80, 81 As Dings and 
de Bruin note, the narrow scope of the proposed models of the self is problematic, as 
73 Trzópek (2013): 232.
74 Schechtman (1990): 113–114.
75 Schechtman (1996): 119–128.
76 Baylis (2012); Baylis (2013).
77 Synofzik, Schlaepfer (2008).
78 Witt, Daniels, Reiff et al. (2008).
79 Schechtman (2009); Schechtman (2010).
80 Baylis (2012); Baylis (2013).
81 There is also important affordance–based account of de Haan, Rietveld, Stokhof et al. (2013) focus-
ing on enactive dimension.
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most of them aim to provide a complete understanding of the potential consequences of 
DBS on the self.82 Finally, the infl uential theories described above discuss DBS–induced 
changes in general, which renders it diffi cult to use them to account for changes specifi c 
to the disease treated with DBS, as well as changes specifi c to the type of DBS system 
utilized in a given therapy (i.e. OL–DBS, CL–DBS, or VCL–DBS). 
This theoretical pluralism, combined with the lack of consensus regarding an 
adequate understanding of the concept of the self, has become a particularly pressing 
issue in recent years in the context of the ongoing neuroethical debate. These circum-
stances preclude the provision of a consensual explanation of the effects of DBS on the 
selves of patients, and consequently, prevent the development of a uniform procedure 
for evaluating the implications of DBS in individual clinical cases. In turn, this makes 
it impossible to calculate the benefi ts and risks related to decisions to initiate, continue, 
or discontinue the treatment. 
 At the same time, however, there can be a tendency in the neuroethical literature 
to regard considerations on the effects of DBS exclusively through the lens of a specifi c 
model of the self as an approach that is too coarse–grained.  Realizing that theoretical 
disputes regarding the most adequate model of the self are far from reaching a resolution, 
neuroethicists have engaged in more fi ne–grained considerations of the effects of DBS 
on the selves of patients. For instance, some applied the concept of burden of normality 
to explain postoperative experiences of DBS patients. According to this notion, DBS 
patients may experience diffi culties in adjusting to becoming “normal,” 83 meaning that 
they cannot cope with the fact of being symptom-free.84 Although the notion of burden 
of normality is central in explaining some of the diffi culties experienced by successfully 
“treated” DBS patients, the majority of the discussion of DBS postoperative changes to 
the self is focused on abnormal side effects. As the extensive literature review undertaken 
in this article refl ects, neuroethicists employ various concepts related to the notion of 
the self in this debate such as personal identity,85 authenticity,86 and autonomy.87  The 
engagement of researchers and the constantly growing number of theoretical works 
analyzing the effects of DBS in terms of the concepts mentioned above show that these 
concepts are regarded as crucial to understanding a broader scope of DBS threats to 
the selves of patients. Thus, this paper attempts to present the most relevant potential 
consequences of DBS in these crucial “dimensions” of the self.
82 Dings, de Bruin (2016).
83 Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer for pointing out that this important notion of the neuro-
ethics of DBS is worth mentioning in this context.
84 Baertschi, Favez, Radomska et al. (2019); Gilbert (2012).
85 Baylis (2013); Bluhm, Cabrera, McKenzie (2019); Focquaert, DeRidder (2009); Lipsman, Glannon 
(2013); Mathews (2011); Schechtman (2010); Witt, Kuhn, Timmermann et al. (2013).
86 Gisquet (2008); Johansson, Garwicz, Kanje et al. (2011); Johansson, Garwicz, Kanje et al. (2014); Krae-
mer (2013a); Kraemer (2013b); Mackenzie, Walker (2015); Mackenzie (2014); Maslen, Pugh, Savulescu 
(2015); Mosley, Hall, Forlini et al. (2014); Nyholm, O’Neill (2016); Pugh, Maslen, Savulescu (2017a); 
Pugh, Maslen, Savulescu (2017b).
87 Brown, Thompson, Herron et al. (2016); Clausen (2010); Douglas (2014); Gilbert (2015); Gilbert, 
O’Brien, Cook (2018); Glannon (2014a); Goddard (2017); Goering (2015); Goering, Klein, Dougherty et 
al. (2017); Kellmeyer, Cochrane, Müller et al. (2016); Klein (2015); Müller, Walter (2010); Pugh, Pycroft, 
Sandberg et al. (2018); Unterrainer, Oduncu (2015); Wardrope (2014).
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Personal identity and DBS
In Gilbert’s study, 8 out of 17 patients (47%) reported changes in self–perception after 
DBS. Some seemed to experience alterations to their sense of the self.88 For example, Pa-
tient 4 said: “I feel like I am who I am now. But it’s not the me that went into the surgery 
[…] No I can’t be the real me anymore—I can’t pretend. […] Well, I think that I felt that 
the person that I have been was somehow observing somebody else but it wasn’t me.” 
Patient 7 reported: “Oh God, I wasn’t me and I knew I wasn’t me and there was nothing 
I could do about it […] I knew what it was! I knew it had been turned up that day. Unlike 
the drugs which creep up on you and you don’t know what’s happening. With this, I 
knew what it was so I knew it was fi xable.” Patient 13 revealed: “I would revert to a state 
of hysterics or something like that much more easily than I would normally have done 
[…] I felt like I had lost my true self, it was way behind me.” Others reported changes in 
activities, mood, or socio–familial dynamics; for example, Patient 14 recounted: “I lost 
all interest in painting.” When interviewer asked: “Would you say that it was voluntary 
or involuntary loss of interest?,” the subject replied, “Involuntary. I tried sitting down 
and paint something, but I just didn’t want to do it.” Schüpbach reported that among 29 
patients with PD (15 male, 14 female) examined during a 3–year study, 66% expressed 
feeling of strangeness and unfamiliarity with themselves after DBS.89 For example, Pa-
tient 1, a 38–year–old female journalist, married with one child, reported “Now I feel 
like a machine, I’ve lost my passion. I don’t recognize myself anymore.” Other patients 
in this study reported: “I don’t feel like myself anymore,” or “I haven’t found myself 
again after the operation.”
Schechtman’s narrative model of self,90 in which narratives constitute the self if 
they meet  articulation and reality constraints, has been most infl uential in the analyses 
of such cases.91 If a person cannot construct a narrative fulfi lling these conditions, or 
given dispositions, thoughts, or actions are recognized as resulting from DBS’s action, 
not from the individual’s plans, desires, or needs that are part of the narrative of the 
self, the personal identity of the patient is threatened.  However, when considering the 
infl uence of DBS on the patients’ identities within the narrative account, Schechtman 
concludes that, although DBS can lead to disruption of personal narrative, the narrative 
approach itself suggests “a way to bring potential discontinuities back into one’s life 
narrative, rather than allowing them to disrupt it.”92 In her narrative account, a person 
might reconstruct and reconstitute her identity in the face of randomness and temporal 
change, as well as contingencies, such as illness, accidents, traumas, or neurointerven-
tions, by incorporating them into her self–understanding and life story. As the narrative 
is a dynamic concept, preservation of personal identity could be compatible even if the 
changes that the patients experience are substantial. Schechtman provides an example 
88 Gilbert (2018).
89 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, Welter et al. (2006).
90 Other versions of narrative concepts of personal identity can be found, for example, in the works 
of Ricoeur (1991), Mackenzie, Poltera (2010), or Atkins (2008).
91 Schechtman (1996); Schechtman (2009); Schechtman (2010).
92 Schechtman (2010).
Przemysław Zawadzki ◦ Dimensions of the Threat to the Self Posed by Deep Brain Stimulation…
1111/28
of the resolution of this sort by recalling the case of an initially alienated woman studied 
by Schüpbach et al., who managed to cope with the fact that she had an electronic de-
vice in her brain by creating an artwork depicting her chest X–ray with the stimulator. 
Schechtman interprets this case as an example of a patient precluding the threat of DBS 
to her identity by engaging in constructing and maintaining a coherent narrative of 
change, and as a result, managing to post–operatively “fi nd herself again”.93
Narrative concepts are one of the most frequently used models of the self in the 
contemporary neuroethical debate around DBS; however, the ideas behind these con-
cepts suffer from various problems. Mackenzie and Walker94 point out the following 
weaknesses of the narrative approach: narratives accounts suggest more authorial control 
over people’s lives and identities than they in fact have;95 imply that we must constantly 
self–consciously refl ect on them;96 and involve interpretation rather than representation 
of our life stories, which raises the question of how one could distinguish truthful from 
confabulated ones.97 Because advocates of narrative accounts have already responded 
to these critiques,98 here, I focus on important arguments for why narrative accounts of 
personal identity are questionable, coming from recent research on the psychology of 
memory and refl ections on cases of patients with neurological disorders. 
Patients suffering from episodic amnesia whose episodic memory99 system has 
been disrupted or damaged seem to retain access to facts about their selves; that is, if 
a system of semantic100 self–knowledge of one’s own traits101 remains intact, it can po-
tentially form the foundation for a sense of personal identity. In fact, some researchers 
have reached similar conclusions in recent years.102 This result suggests that narrative 
approaches do not adequately capture conditions for the sense of identity, since, due to 
the non–functional episodic memory system, a person not only cannot create a narrative 
that meets the articulation and reality constraints imposed by Schechtman, but may not 
93 Ibidem.
94 Mackenzie, Walker (2015).
95 Christman (2004).
96 Strawson (2004).
97 Matthews, Kennett (2012).
98 Mackenzie, Walker (2015).
99 Episodic memory system records events as being experienced by the self from a specifi c point of 
view in time and space. Remembrance of these events takes place by re-experiencing them in a quasi-
perceptual way, i.e., with the awareness that “this happened to me” (see: Tulving, 1985; Tulving, 
1993; Wheeler, Stuss, Tulving 1997).
100 Semantic memory contains relatively general, contextless knowledge (e.g., apples are round). It 
usually “lacks memory” of the source of its origin, i.e., it is experienced as knowledge without refer-
ence to circumstances of where and when it was acquired. Semantic memory system may also contain 
knowledge about facts related to the self (e.g., I was born in Warsaw). However, one does not have 
to reproduce the context of acquiring this knowledge in order to retrieve information, even when the 
knowledge regards the very self of a person. 
101 Knowledge of one’s own traits is a kind of semantic self-knowledge system (see: Tulving, 1985; 
Tulving, 1993; Wheeler, Stuss, Tulving, 1997). It has a form of generalizations and summaries of 
one’s dispositions. These generalized summaries are a form of database that allows decision-making 
processes to quickly evaluate one’s characteristics (see, e.g., Klein, Gangi, 2010; Klein, Cosmides, 
Costabile et al., 2002).
102 See:  Craver (2012); Haslam, Jetten, Haslam et al. (2011); Illman, Rathbone, Kemp et al. (2011); 
Klein (2013).
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be able to create any narrative at all about her life.103 Nevertheless, a person still retains 
relevant sense of the self. Such a conclusion seems to hold in several clinical cases of 
various neurological disorders.104 Obviously, the issue of the empirical adequacy of 
narrative models, as well as a potential falsifi cation of the narrative as the necessary 
condition for personal identity, require further detailed discussion which is beyond the 
scope of this paper.105
However, there are also issues associated with narrative theories that are more 
apparent and pressing in the context of neuroethical considerations. Narrative theories 
can be undermined not only from the position that they  do not adequately show the 
foundation upon which the sense (or experience) of personal identity stands (necessary 
condition), but also from the argument that they do not give justice to the multidimen-
sionality of the analyzed entity, namely, the self. This is because narrative theories fall 
into the category of “defl ationary” conceptions of the self—they claim that the self is one 
thing and nothing more.106 This, in turn, does not allow for a suffi ciently rich account of 
the self in the framework in which one could understand all relevant threats that DBS 
may pose to personal identity. 
Two issues require resolution in this context. First, neuroethical considerations 
should make use of a theory of the self that fi nds the features of the self that are necessary 
to preserve personal identity. Second, this theory should embrace more aspects of the 
self.107 Responding to these concerns would help in constructing an account of personal 
identity which is capable of explaining the diachronic constitution and reconstitution of 
the identities of DBS patients.
Authenticity and DBS
In recent neuroethical literature, the concept of authenticity has become increasingly 
infl uential in addressing the threats to the self posed by DBS. For some,108 authenticity 
is in strict interrelation with narrative identity; if the desires of a person would have 
been fundamentally altered by DBS in a manner that does not fi t within her narrative 
identity, then these desires are not authentically owned by this person. Others argue that: 
“The appeal to authenticity is redundant and blurs the distinction between narrative 
identity and autonomy.”109
The most basic idea of authenticity was well expressed by William: “Some things 
are in some real sense really you, or express what you are, and others aren’t.”110 Such a 
characterization implies that humans have various elements of the self; some of these 
103 A disorder known as dysnarrativia.
104 See, e.g., Klein (2014); Klein (2012); Klein (2013); Klein, Nichols (2012); Klein, Lax (2010).
105 For example, there is a need for a conceptual discussion on the notions associated with personal 
identity, such as,  sense of personal identity, self-continuity, sense of the self, as well as the issue of 
how they relate to one another.
106 Gallagher (2018).
107 For such a multidimensional proposition see: e.g. Dings, de Bruin (2016); Gallagher (2018); Za-
wadzki (2020).
108 For example, Christman (2009); Sharp, Wasserman (2016).
109 Mackenzie, Walker (2015).
110 As cited in Johansson, Garwicz, Kanje et al. (2011).
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elements are parts of the true selves, and others are not. In this approach, being authen-
tic assumes we are living in accordance with elements that are part of our true selves, 
and alienated from those that are not. Kraemer claims that appealing to the concepts of 
“authenticity” and “alienation” in explaining the experience of patients after DBS could 
allow us to better understand these patients, and, in some cases, could even lead to the 
re–evaluation of the consequences of DBS for the self.111 
In the context of DBS treatment, Kraemer interprets reports like “I feel like my-
self” as expressions of authenticity. Alienation, on the other hand, as the opposition to 
authenticity, is indicated by the following statements: “I felt like I had lost my true self, 
it was way behind me.”,112 or “I don’t feel like myself anymore.”113 Kraemer regards both 
authenticity and alienation as mental states. In her view, they are not neutral experiences, 
however; they involve normative component: authenticity is something that a person 
should strive for, alienation is something one should avoid. She believes that this nor-
mative component stems from the way we experience these states. Counterintuitively, 
however, authenticity does not necessarily have to be a pleasant experience for the per-
son. Feeling authentic can be diffi cult, yet valuable. Similarly, alienation, despite being 
something one ought to avoid, may be experienced positively. Kraemer cites Frederick 
Neuhouser in explaining what alienation can “mean” for the person experiencing it: “a 
sense of meaninglessness or estrangement, a loss of power in relation to self and world, 
and a subjugation to the products of one’s own activity.” Both of these experiences seem 
to be present in patients receiving DBS treatment. 
For example, in the case of Patient 1 in Schüpbach et al. mentioned above, re-
searchers reported that she had been a dynamic person before DBS despite her motor 
handicap.114 However, after 18 months of treatment, despite a major improvement of her 
motor symptoms due to STN stimulation, she reported that she no longer felt like herself; 
she was no longer able to conduct any professional activity, constantly felt exhausted, 
and had lost her vitality, interest in her family, inspiration, and taste for life in general. 
Kraemer claims that the experiences of this patient can be explained when considered 
alongside the concept of alienation: “After treatment, not only does her work–life seem 
alienating, but also she feels alienated from life–goals she identifi ed with, as well as from 
her new, improved body.”115
However, DBS can also have the opposite effect on the self; namely, patients may 
feel that the treatment allows them to fi nd their true selves. Kraemer analyzed the case of 
Patient 2 from the study of Schüpbach et al., a 48–year–old male accountant who worked 
part–time for 7 years because of PD. Before DBS, he required daily care, with his wife 
helping him with all of his daily tasks. After receiving treatment, he felt empowered and 
decided to regain control over his life. He reported “During all these years I was asleep, 
now I am going to take my life in hand, my life before PD.” Kraemer interprets this case 
as reintroducing the connection of the patient with his own true self. She suggests that 
111 Kraemer (2013b).
112 Gilbert (2018).
113 Schüpbach, Gargiulo, Welter et al. (2006).
114 Ibidem.
115 Kraemer (2013b).
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the claim about “taking life in his own hands” indicates that, before DBS, the patient 
felt that he was inauthentic, and alienated from his true self; the treatment, however, 
made him ready to become the “master of his own destiny,” with the means to live a 
life aligned with his true self. 
Kraemer postulates that both Patient 1 and Patient 2 seem to distinguish two 
modes in their lives: “mode one,” that is, the mode experienced when they regard them-
selves as authentic; and “mode two,” the mode they experience when alienated from 
their true selves. For Patient 2, the “authentic mode” was realized when under treatment; 
then, he felt ready to reclaim his real life (“I want to regain my life, my life before PD”). 
For him, PD was the cause of being in “mode two”. He felt that his illness put his true 
self to sleep; he felt that his life was not really his own during PD, and thus he reported 
being alienated. Strikingly, the experiences of Patient 1 are in contradiction with those of 
Patient 2. Patient 1 had felt that her “mode one” was present when she was diseased. Her 
daily struggle with PD gave her goal in life. She reports: “Before stimulation, I wanted 
to be like everybody else, I didn’t want to be considered only as sick. I fought for that 
every day! Now I fi nd myself less impassioned, I regret the period where I did battle. 
Now it’s the warrior’s repose, I no longer have something to struggle against, my life is 
empty. I get up every day, but have no goal, no horizon.” 
Kraemer notes that Patient 2 identifi es authenticity with autonomy. For him, in 
order to become himself, he must regain autonomous functioning by freeing himself 
from the care of his wife. It is worth pointing out that the case of Patient 1 also shows 
the crucial role of autonomy in experiencing authenticity. Her constant struggle with her 
disease gave Patient 1 purpose; its realization gave her a sense of agency,116 which she 
could not fi nd after the successful treatment.117 Both of these interpretations are consist-
ent in that prominent philosophical accounts of autonomy take authenticity as partially 
constitutive of autonomy.118 For example, Christman explicitly states “Put most simply, 
to be autonomous is to be one’s own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, 
conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are 
part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self.”119 For this reason, in the 
following sections I focus on the latter of those dimensions potentially endangered by 
the effects of DBS—autonomy.
Autonomy and various DBS systems
The reference point in the neuroethical literature concerning the possible effects of DBS 
on autonomy is a hierarchical model proposed by Frankfurt.120 Frankfurt argues that 
autonomy requires a person’s ability to possess second–order volitions with which she 
identifi es—that is, regards them as authentic elements of herself. Crucially, second–or-
116 For a systematic approach to the role of such narrative factors in the sense of agency, see: Zawadzki 
(2021).
117 It is worth noting that this case can also be interpreted as an example of the “burden of normality”.
118  Wardrope (2014).
119 Christman (2018).
120 Frankfurt (1969); Frankfurt (1971).
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der volitions also enable a person to distance herself from spontaneous, often elusive, 
fi rst–order desires. In this view, autonomy emerges when there is a congruency between 
a person’s second–order volitions and her fi rst–order desires; an autonomous person 
endorses her fi rst–order desires. In contrast, autonomy is disrupted when there is a 
discrepancy between second–order volitions and fi rst–order desires, but the person still 
behaves in accordance with the dictates of the latter. 
 One example, where Frankfurt’s model of autonomy has been applied from the 
ethical point of view of DBS treatments concerns patients with anorexia nervosa. Müller 
et al. suggest that people suffering from anorexia become caught in a vicious circle from 
which they cannot escape: they want to starve themselves despite knowing that such 
behavior is unhealthy and threatens their lives.121 Interpreting this scheme against the 
background of Frankfurt’s theory of autonomy, the fi rst–order desires dominate over 
the second–order volitions of these patients. 
Maslen, Pugh, and Savulescu discuss the potential of DBS as a means to treat the 
symptoms of anorexia.122 They debate various strategies to achieve this goal; one, inspired 
by Frankfurt’s theory, is termed “promotion of comparative cognitive control.” There 
are two ways in which comparative cognitive control can be enhanced with DBS: either 
by reducing the compulsive need to diet and avoid eating, or by increasing top–down 
control over this compulsion. If the patient experiences an irresistible fi rst–order desire 
that does not align with her autonomously chosen goals, reducing the strength of such 
a compulsive urge with the use of DBS can help the patient to regain control and act 
in a manner aligned with her higher–order desires. Conversely, in cases in which the 
patient feels that the motivation to engage in weight loss behaviors expresses her au-
thentic self, she may not welcome an attempt to reduce her fi rst–order desire that leads 
to a positively valued end.  However, Maslen, Pugh, and Savulescu claim that, even in 
such situations, DBS could still promote the person’s autonomy even if it only serves 
as a means to give her resources to be more successful in self–governing by remedying 
a failure in top–down cortical control over compulsive drives to diet. Maslen and col-
leagues compare this strategy to the situation of a person, who can resist drinking, but 
nonetheless chooses to drink on some occasions. This strategy, however, seems riskier 
than the former, as it assumes that the person will choose (due to the additional cognitive 
resources) to behave in a manner aligned with other second–order desires, like desire 
to survive, suffi ciently often.
Frankfurt’s autonomy model can help examine the ethics of DBS treatment, and 
it even illuminates the therapeutic potential of DBS in cases of patients suffering from 
certain diseases, such as anorexia. However, the future of the ethics of DBS will require 
a theory of autonomy that takes into account not only challenges related to the specifi c 
ailments DBS aims to treat, but also the new kinds of threats arising from the technol-
ogy of DBS itself—that is, emerging forms of treatments, like advisory brain devices123 
or VCL–DBS.124 It might seem that patients’ autonomy will only be enhanced by these 
121 Müller, Riedmüller, Walter et al. (2015).
122 Maslen, Pugh, Savulescu (2015).
123 Gilbert, O’Brien, Cook (2018).
124 Brown, Moore, Herron et al. (2016).
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technologies, as patients play a decisive role in applying stimulation with such systems. 
While some authors argue that this is the case, others claim that such a result is far from 
obvious. Below, these issues are analyzed in the context of  widely debated case of “the 
Dutch Patient” (DP); I discuss it in a different context than it is usually the case in neu-
roethical literature. Most authors consider the ethics of this case from the perspective of 
taking the most adequate measures to respect DP’s autonomy in his complex institutional 
situation. Below, the hypothetical situation in which DP uses one of the emerging forms 
of DBS treatments is presented as an illustration of a potential threat to his autonomy 
that could arise solely from the technology used. 
DP was treated for PD with the help of OL–DBS. The treatment was effective, but 
it caused multiple side effects: mania, megalomania, and impulsiveness. Given that the 
treatment appeared to be leading the patient to compulsive gambling, falling into debt, 
confl ict with the police, and ultimately, forced hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital, 
doctors faced a dilemma about whether the device should be permanently disabled. The 
solution that seemed appropriate to the medical staff was to temporarily turn off the 
device and then ask the patient about his preferences concerning the continuation of DBS 
therapy. With his DBS disabled, DP decided that it was more important to him to stop 
the symptoms of PD, even given the symptoms caused by DBS, and signed an advance 
directive agreeing to remain under psychiatric care while the device was activated.125 
There is much to consider from the ethical point of view of DP. For example, 
whether DP’s behavior under DBS was the result of realizing authentic desires of his true 
self; whether it was autonomous;126 and even whether DP was autonomous when the de-
vice was turned off, or if DBS irreversibly changed him.127 Here, however, as mentioned 
above, even more complicated hypothetical scenario building upon the case of DP, in 
which is assumed to have used a DBS system of the new generation, will be considered.
New DBS systems allow patients to stay in “the decisional loop.” However, 
there is no data concerning the impact of such systems on the sense of self of the pa-
tients. Recently, Gilbert, O’Brien, and Cook addressed this gap by examining how the 
fi rst–in–humans experimental advisory brain devices capable of predicting epilepsy 
seizures infl uence the sense of autonomy of patients.128 To this end, researchers con-
ducted in–depth semi structured interviews to obtain fi rst–person narratives of the 
subjective experiences of patients. Gilbert and colleagues regrouped subjects into fi ve 
phenomenological clusters refl ecting patients’ autonomy and decision–making processes:
(1) insecurities and risks attached to living with epilepsy; (2) how patients integrate de-
vice predictions into their deliberative processes leading up to their relevant decisions;
(3) patients’ distrust of the device; (4) device–induced sense of control and empowerment; 
and (5) device–induced lack of confi dence and sense of control. The authors’ analysis of 
the data led them to the following conclusions: 1) being in the loop may partly increase 
a sense of autonomy over decision–making; 2) being in the loop may partly decrease a 
125 Smeding (2008).
126 Kraemer (2013a).
127 For a discussion of the reversibility of DBS see: Pugh (2019).
128 Gilbert, O’Brien, Cook (2018).
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sense of autonomy over decision–making; 3) being in the loop may not impact a sense 
of autonomy over decision–making. 
Here, I would like to focus on one seemingly paradoxical consequence of Conclu-
sion 1, namely that increasing a sense of autonomy over decision–making by staying in 
the decisional loop can actually lead to a decrease in a patient’s overall autonomy. Klein 
et al., discussing the ethics of VCL–DBS in the context of psychiatric disorders, raises this 
issue by indicating that there is a possibility that “if a patient is given control over device 
settings, the temptation to increase stimulation settings to feel better and better may be 
diffi cult to resist, and patients may fear the introduction of a new kind of addiction.”129 
It is worth noting here that VCL–DBS systems may not only threaten patient autonomy 
when used to treat addiction; it seems to be an inherent risk of the use of DBS systems 
that give control to the patients (regardless of the disorder being treated).
Even in the case of PD patients, such as DP, there is a threat to autonomy if the pa-
tient is treated with the use of a VCL–DBS system. If experiencing DBS–related euphoria, a 
common symptom in the manic state, DP could experience an insurmountable temptation to 
turn on and amplify the stimulation, in order to achieve this phenomenologically pleasant 
mental state. As he would have total control over the device, he could enter a self–destruc-
tive cycle, leading him to engage in riskier, or even dangerous actions. As Brown, Moore, 
et al. point out in discussing the case of DP: “Mania is often accompanied by feelings of 
grandiosity or invulnerability, and so a patient may refuse to acknowledge the negative 
consequences of their stimulation.”130 They further comment that for this reason, DP’s au-
tonomy could be “hijacked” or could become “addicted” to the system through a feedback 
loop that causes him to decide to leave the device constantly turned on. In this type of case, 
what is particularly problematic is that, if medical staff working with OL–DBS could easily 
detect dangerous changes in behavior at the time of programming, with VCL–DBS, patients 
could potentially trigger and experience changes over time, in a manner that preclude early 
detection and re–programming of the device. Moreover, patients “addicted” from achieving 
a desired psychological state may even intentionally hide dangerous symptoms caused by 
the stimulation by turning it off during medical appointments. 
Interestingly, Pugh et al. argue that one may still understand DP’s choice as en-
hancing his autonomy, if the stimulation allows him to achieve the goals that he himself 
believes that he has most reasons to achieve.131 They quote Unterrainer and Oduncu in 
using the notion of Ulysses’ contract to analyze the case of DP in this context.132 Just as 
Ulysses tied himself to the mast as a means to protect himself from being lured to his 
death by the Sirens’ song, so DP had to reduce his autonomy to achieve his desired 
end; DP chose to live in a state of mania, in order to avoid remaining bed–ridden due 
to his motor disability. Pugh and colleagues argue that this means DP’s decision can be 
interpreted as actually enhancing autonomy. His actions facilitated the pursuit of the 
desired end he felt was most important for him, even if the effects of his decision took 
away his freedom to achieve other competing goals. 
129 Klein, Goering, Gagne et al. (2016).
130 Brown, Moore, Herron et al. (2016).
131 Pugh, Pycroft, Sandberg et al. (2018).
132 Unterrainer, Oduncu (2015).
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While this perspective may seem convincing in the particular case of DP, it can 
be ethically problematic as a general rule; DP’s decision not only takes away his liberty 
in pursuing competing goals, but also undermines his autonomy in regard to all possible 
decisions afterwards. Although making decision with the DBS device disabled allowed 
him to exercise autonomy in a given moment in time, it led him to sacrifi ce his autonomy 
in the future. One could understand this dilemma better as the choice between local and 
global autonomy.133 In a local understanding of autonomy, one may ask whether a person 
is autonomous with regard to a particular decision in a given situation at a given time, 
and whether she has the necessary resources to act in a manner aligned with her will. 
In a global sense of autonomy, on the other hand, one may ask whether a person is able 
to autonomously pursue chosen goals over an extended period. From this perspective, 
one could argue that DP enhanced his local autonomy at the cost of reducing, or in his 
extreme case, erasing his global autonomy (as DBS diminished DP’s autonomy both in 
terms of permanent volitional impairments, e.g., compulsive gambling and mania, and 
the physical restriction of his freedom in the form of compulsory lifelong hospitaliza-
tion). Although local autonomy, the autonomy of a particular decision, is relevant, there 
are situations in which we should give it up in order to make paternalistic decisions to 
preserve the global autonomy of the patient. This is particularly important if this kind 
of decision has severe life-altering consequences. DP’s case could seemingly serve as 
an example of such an approach; however, in his case, the relevant choice is not only 
between different kinds of autonomy, but also between global autonomy and movement 
abilities required for normal everyday functioning. 
Taking into account the fact that DBS is a last resort therapy, patients such as DP 
have failed to respond to all other treatments and thus it is imperative to emphasize that 
DP would continue to suffer from untreated symptoms of the disease without DBS. It 
therefore seems that DP has to face a dramatic choice between prisons of different sizes 
and types—in the case of being treated, a ward and a “mental prison,” and if left un-
treated, a bed. This makes DP’s choice almost impossible to assess from a neuroethical 
standpoint134 and devastating for the patient and his family. At this point, we should also 
note that PD that could make DP bedridden poses a threat not only to his autonomy, but 
also to his identity and authenticity. Thus, symptoms of the disease that DBS can control 
are as much of a threat to these dimensions of the self as the adverse side effects of the 
treatment. It should therefore be emphasized once again that  there is no choice between 
DBS and the “neutral state” of the patient. The choice concerning taking DBS therapy 
is always entangled in a situational context in which the patient has a very serious and 
intractable disease. To conclude, the case of DP is extremely complicated from the neu-
roethical perspective because it is profoundly diffi cult to assess whether the symptoms 
of the disease or the institutional and psychiatric side effects of treating it should be 
considered more benefi cial (or harmful). Moreover, it is impossible to simply transfer the 
responsibility for the decision to the patient himself (which might seem the best option 
in such a diffi cult situation) because it is not obvious at which moment the patient is ac-
133 Dworkin (1988).
134 After all, what is worse – the symptoms of the disease or the institutional and psychiatric side 
effects of treating it? 
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tually given an autonomous choice (whether it is when his local (synchronous) or global 
(diachronic) autonomy is respected). As discussed above, both DP’s decision–making 
process as well as his fi nal decision depend on what kind of autonomy decision–makers 
(i.e., legal guardians, clinicians, ethical boards) choose to respect.
The utilization of OL–DBS in the actual case of DP led him to be considered 
non–autonomous, and effectively prompted the medical staff to temporarily turn off the 
device. Only under this condition did doctors ask him about his preferences concerning 
further therapy. In this decision, the local autonomy of the patient was the most impor-
tant factor. The utilization of a VCL–DBS system could further complicate cases such as 
DP’s, as its use can be intertwined with a sense of autonomy and self–narrative of the 
patient. Unlike OL–DBS systems, where there seems to be clarity concerning the forces 
distinct from the self which infl uence the behavior of a person, in VCL–DBS, a patient 
may experience the sense of agency stemming from the control over the stimulation. 
This could lead the patient to feel more responsible for his actions during treatment, 
as he might not attribute the changes in his behavior to the external force of DBS, but 
rather to his own weakness of will that prevented him from turning off the stimulation. 
Such considerations lead to the conclusion that OL–DBS and VCL–DBS systems 
can have both positive and negative consequences for the autonomy of patients. The 
infl uence of each of these types of DBS, however, differs in substantial ways. Being in the 
decisional loop can further complicate the impact of DBS on patient autonomy, instead of 
straightforwardly enhancing it. Moreover, local (or synchronous) autonomy is not neces-
sarily the same as the global (or diachronic) autonomy of the patient. Finally, discussion 
of the case of DP indicates one more relationship that must be addressed regarding the 
ethics of DBS; namely, that autonomy of a person is interwoven with her own sense of 
responsibility. However, as there is currently a gap in the knowledge concerning how 
remaining in the decisional loop infl uences patients’ sense of responsibility, and there 
is only one theoretical work concerning hypothetical cases that has sought to prepare 
the stage for conceptual considerations regarding this issue,135 more work in neuroethics 
will be required to understand this complex relationship.
Conclusions
The article examined potential threats posed by various DBS treatments to the selves of 
patients and various dimensions related to these threats: personal identity, authenticity, 
and autonomy. The most infl uential theoretical models and practical considerations ex-
plored in the neuroethical literature have been critically analyzed in this paper. I argued 
that various proposed models may be theoretically, empirically, or ethically questionable, 
and thus their further refi nement seems to be required. 
I have pointed out why narrative models of personal identity seem to be empiri-
cally questionable, and why their defl ationary character poses a problem for accounting 
for DBS threats to the identities of patients. Focusing on different aspects of DBS threats 
to the self, I applied concepts of authenticity and alienation to better understand patients’ 
reports after DBS. The analysis of clinical cases undertaken here suggests that the issue of 
135 Brown, Moore, Herron et al. (2016).
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authenticity is interwoven with the issue of autonomy of the patient. Frankfurt’s account 
of autonomy, with its embedded authenticity reference, proved helpful in examining the 
ethics of DBS treatment, as well as in illuminating therapeutic potential of DBS in cases of 
patients with anorexia. However, as pointed out, modern DBS systems (e.g., VCL–DBS) 
require a theory of autonomy that can account for new kinds of threats arising from 
technological innovation in DBS treatments. In particular, the issue of “being inside the 
decisional loop” was analyzed against the background context of various related theories. 
I have adopted the notions of local (synchronous) and global (diachronic) autonomy to 
account for the potential consequences of utilizing such systems in DBS therapies, and 
concluded that these two concepts may sometimes be at odds with each other. Finally, I 
have pointed out the relationship between autonomy and the sense of responsibility in 
DBS patients and indicated the need for neuroethicists to further study this relationship. 
This paper sought to demonstrate that the effects of DBS on the selves of patients 
cannot be accounted for solely through the lens of any specifi c extant model of the self; 
more fi ne–grained concepts are required. The extensive review of the literature under-
taken in this article shows that neuroethicists should employ notions of personal identity, 
authenticity, and autonomy in the ongoing debate, as DBS poses tangible threats to the 
selves of patients in these dimensions. The considerations described and examined in 
this paper show that these dimensions are intertwined, and that DBS’s potential impact 
on the selves of patients can only be properly understood when all of these factors are 
taken into account. Hence, novel approaches that carefully scrutinize the complex in-
terrelations between these dimensions are needed to gain new insights into the ethics 
of neuromodulatory treatments such as DBS.
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